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Low-Level Equal Protection: The
Scope and Logic of Deferential
Review
BY R.

GEORGE WRIGHT*

INTRODUCTION

One of the most frequently litigated constitutional issues is
the alleged governmental denial of the equal protection of the
laws mandated by the state or federal constitution. In a large
subset of these cases, the objecting party does not claim that the
allegedly unconstitutional governmental classification is drawn
along historically suspect' or even quasi-suspect lines.2 Indeed,
the objecting party does not usually even claim that the classification burdens some constitutionally fundamental right. 3 The
objecting party is thus unable to cite any widely recognized
justification for especially intensive judicial scrutiny of the classification.
Even in the admitted absence of any such traditional reason
for heightened judicial scrutiny, however, the Supreme Court
and, to an even greater degree, state supreme courts, have developed and applied to varying effect a remarkably diverse array
of equal protection tests. Arguably, some divergence in the

* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.

I E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (discrimination on the
alleged basis of ethnicity); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (Justice Stone, in his historic footnote, posed, but did not answer, the question
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
2 E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based classification must have
substantial relationship to achieving important government objectives).
I E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (constitutionally fundamental right
of suffrage triggered heightened judicial scrutiny).
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precise verbal formulation of an essentially uniform "low-level
scrutiny" test is inevitable, and no great significance should be
attributed to minor terminological differences. In practice, however, the diversity among ostensibly "low-level scrutiny" formulations leads to great diversity in the degree of judicial
deference accorded to the legislative classification, and to great
diversity of result on the equal protection challenge itself.
This Article provides some sense of the range of crucial
differences among the "low-level scrutiny" equal protection formulas. It argues that in the absence of suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications, or the burdening of constitutionally fundamental
rights, when those persons ultimately burdened by a statutory
classification are not concretely identifiable in advance by the
legislators, courts are justified only in imposing the very least
demanding, most deferential variety of low-level equal protection
tests. The "loosest ' 4 of the low-level equal protection formulas
should not be interpreted, however, as inviting judicial abdication, or a rubber-stamping of the legislative classification, and
most certainly does not create a meaningless test which will be
invariably met. The "loosest" among plausible low-level equal
protection formulas should still be a coherent, nontautological,
and significant test that is not without "teeth." Such a formulation is suited for an appropriate role in striking down illegitimate classifications, or classifications not plausibly justifiable
on the basis of any sort of broad, public interest-oriented considerations. That same formulation should not, however, be used
as an instrument for judicial usurpation of the legitimate purview
of the legislature, especially when there exists no reason to
suppose that the legislative classification resulted from an undemocratically defective or tainted legislative process.
I.

THE RANGE OF Low-LEVEL SCRUTINY Fomu-As

Probably the most familiar element among low-level scrutiny
equal protection formulas is the requirement that the classification, or the classificatory scheme, be " 'rationally related to a

I "Looseness" is here intended to suggest the most deferential, least stringently
formulated tests for equal protection. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.

1988-89]

Low-LEVEL EQUAL PROTECTION

legitimate state interest.' ' ' 5 The Supreme Court is susceptible to
different moods, and these moods are often reflected in different
formulas. Such moods can, with time, decisively affect judicial
6
results .
In a deferential mood, the Court has said that the "constitutional safeguard" of equal protection is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
aside if any
justify it. 7
In a less deferential mood, the Court has held that "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
all persons similarly
to the object of the legislation, so that
8
circumstanced shall be treated alike.''
Plainly, these formulas are not logically equivalent. The
latter is on its face more stringent, the former more lenient.
Consider, for example, the case of a statutory classification that
is imperfectly drafted, in the sense that some few persons similarly situated with respect to the goals of the statute are differently classified and differently treated. Such a classification could
presumably pass the more lenient test, despite the presence of
"some inequality." The same classification should fail the more
stringent test, however, since logically not "all persons similarly
circumstanced" are "treated alike." Arguably, the connection
between the classification and the statutory aims, i.e., the logic
of the classification, need only be "conceivable" under the more
lenient formulation, but must be supported 9 by at least some

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 859 (1988) (quoting New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
6 See text accompanying notes 7-8 infra.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
9 While there is a presumption that the classification is not violative of the equal
protection clause, see McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26, the burden of proof is, in practice,
often on the government to advance the requisite statutory purposes, lest the challenging
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consideration of actual states of affairs under the more stringent
test. These differences in logic are reflected in judicial practice.
Not surprisingly, courts finding an equal protection violation on
the basis of "low-level scrutiny" incline toward one or another
variant of the relatively stringent test quoted above, rather than
the more lenient formula or some variant thereof, as we shall
see below' 0 at length.
To develop a sense of the variety and range of the lenient
and stringent low-level scrutiny tests, one might note the difference between what might be called "simple" tests and "compound" tests. A classification tested by the presence of a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest" contains but two elements: the legitimacy of the state interest,' 2 and the rationality
of the relation between the interest and the classification.' 3 Com-

pound tests, on the other hand, might include, as conjunctive
requirements, elements such as the reasonableness of the classification, the nonarbitrariness of the classification, a fair and
substantial relation between the classification and its object, and
a requirement that persons similarly situated be treated alike.' 4
There may well be substantial overlap in practice among some
of the conjunctive elements of a compound test. One might be
forgiven for imagining, for example, that a requirement of reasonableness will often tend to render a requirement of nonarbitrariness largely superfluous, and vice versa. The frequently
repeated judicial language of the compound tests should not,
however, be treated as involving mere surplusage. Unfortunately,
though, the more that courts are inclined to give at least some
independent effect to each literally distinct element of a conjunctive formulation, the greater the chances for the classifica-

party be saddled with the task of negating all of the possible purposes; see, e.g., Pennell,
108 S. Ct. at 859; Hooper v. Deukmejian, 176 Cal. Rptr. 569, 585 (Ct. App. 1981)
("defendants have advanced no rational basis for the classifications"). But cf. Jones v.
State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (Idaho 1976) (burden of showing absence of
reasonableness of relation on challenging party).
Jo See infra notes 11-59 and accompanying text.
" E.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (requiring only that "the
classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest").
12

Id. at 304.

Id. at 305-06.
" E.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415.
"1
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tion being struck down through judicial intrusion into the
legislative sphere.
The easiest way to show that compound formulas tend to be
less deferential, and more demanding, than simpler formulas is
to note that some simple formulas are essentially subsets of some
compound formulas. For example, there is, as noted above,
authority for the view that low-level scrutiny requires consideration only of whether the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.' 5 This test, as formulated, however, is
merely one component of a compound test that asks, for example, whether "the statutory classification has some rational
basis in fact and bears a rational relationship to legitimate governmental objectives.' 1 6 Such compound tests are genuinely intended to be more rigorous than even those component elements
that might suffice by themselves.
[TIhere are two separate and distinct prongs to the rational
basis test. The first prong of the test has been formulated as
requiring that "the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary,"
... or that "the statutory classification has some rational
basis in fact. . . 2" The second prong requires either that "the
statutory classification ... bear[s] a rational relationship to
"reasonably
legitimate state objectives," . . . or that it be
7
interest."'
governmental
legitimate
a
to
related
Thus, compound tests are not merely "simple" tests adorned
with decorative repetition and stylistic flourishes, they are typically more demanding.
The compound formulas vary significantly among themselves. Both state and federal courts have, over a substantial
span of modern constitutional history, often adopted the formula that requires that the classification " 'be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and ... rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "'s

IsSee supra note 5 and

accompanying text.
Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49 (Colo. 1984) (en banc).
17 Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
11Brown v. Merbo, 506 P.2d 212, 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1973) (en banc)
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)); see F.S. Royster Guano Co., 253
U.S. at 415.
16
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Other compound formulas differ substantially, as for example,
the "minimally" compound test upholding the classification unless it is "shown to be palpably arbitrary and without a sound
basis in reason."' 19 Another "minimally" compound test upholds
classifications that "are not patently arbitrary and bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest.' '20
The various compound tests for low-level equal protection
scrutiny run the risk of being treated as, at best, internally
redundant or in part merely rhetorical. At worst, such tests may
invite not merely a serious judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of the classification, but a judicial re-weighing of the competing public policies or of the weight of the complex empirical
evidence undergirding legislative presuppositions of fact. Such
judicial re-weighing or second-guessing in many cases involving
low-level equal protection is not jurisprudentially appropriate.2'
Standards such as "patent" or "palpable" arbitrariness seem
suitably restrained and deferential to legislative judgment. The
vagueness and ambiguity of a term like "arbitrary" may serve,
however, as the entering wedge for decidedly nondeferential
judicial recalculations of fairness, equity, sound public policy,
and the weight of the public interest. 22
'1'

19People v. Superior Court, 241 Cal. Rptr. 322, 326 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Whittaker v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 358, 367, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 719 (1968)).
20 Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N. D. 1978) (dicta).
21 For a traditional statement of the logic of judicial restraint, see Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Cocking, 628 P.2d 1, 3, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848 (1981) (en banc) ("the
Legislature's decision ... is supported by a variety of rational, legitimate reasons. That
we may disagree with some or all of these reasons affords no justification whatever for
the substitution of our own view of what is proper public policy for that of the
Legislature").
2 It is perhaps rhetorically unfair, yet tempting, to note that an inquiry into
"arbitrariness," among other considerations, was undertaken by the majority in the
generally discredited substantive due process case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 56 (1905). Unattractive ideology or public policy may be thought of as not merely
ill-advised, but "arbitrary." See id. For additional recent examples of the use of an
"arbitrariness" criterion in low-level scrutiny cases, see Times Mirror Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 237 Cal. Rptr. 346, 354 (Ct. App. 1987), appealdismissed, 108 S. Ct. 743
(1988); Capitol Records, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 204 Cal. Rptr. 802, 813 (Ct.
App. 1984); McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal. Rptr. 252, 258 (Ct. App. 1984) (expressly
defining a classification as not arbitrary "if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it," thereby rendering an arbitrariness inquiry utterly redundant in
any of a wide variety of low-level equal protection formulas); Jones, 555 P.2d at 407;
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) (any recovery
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The above point is made clearer by examining alternative

formulas where such potential for judicial hubris is more obvious. Some courts, for example, have seized upon, or been misled
by, an ambiguity in the term "discrimination." One classically
deferential formulation is that "[a] statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."23 This deferential formulation changes character,

though, if it is assumed to license an inquiry by the court into
whether or not a legislative classification is "discriminatory."
The phrase "statutory discrimination" is plainly intended to be
synonymous merely with "statutory classification," and is used

neutrally. The term "discriminatory" is of course also used in
a pejorative sense, implying disapproval. Courts that make an

independent inquiry into whether a statutory classification is
"discriminatory" or not 24 are adopting this latter interpretation.

"Discrimination" in this sense is, however, quite often perilously
subjective. Whether, for example, limitations on remedies and
recoveries in medical malpractice actions 25 or the classifications
established by automobile guest statutes 26 are "discriminatory"
or not will inevitably tend to reflect the tastes and sentiments of
the court deciding the issue.
A judge's interpretation of a legislative enactment "in accordance with his personal conception of right and wrong, sound
and unsound policy" 27 is often thought to be illegitimate. Tests
permitting the constitutionality of the classifications to depend,

even in part, on essentially unconstrained judicial determinations

"permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis" creates a "special privilege" in violation of
Illinois Constitution); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362, 365 (Kan. 1974) ("arbitrarily"
created classifications violate the "principle of equality").
2 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426.
14See, e.g., Jones, 555 P.2d at 406-07. Jones requires a showing "that the statute
under attack creates a discriminatory classification." Id. at 406. Cf. Arneson, 270
N.W.2d at 137 (statutory classification violates due process requirements in part because
of its discriminatory character). The court in Henry literally required that the legislative
classification not be "created" discriminatorily. Henry, 518 P.2d at 365. This appears
to be aimed not at the fairness of the classification itself, but at the fairness of the
legislative process creating the classification. See id.
2 See, e.g., Jones, 555 P.2d at 406-07.
2 See, e.g., Henry, 518 P.2d at 367-68.
27 Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 179, 200 (1986).
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of vague and ambiguous standards such as arbitrariness or dis-

crimination also serve inevitably to expand the judicial role.
Paradoxically, governmental arbitrariness is increased by the

mind and will of judicial decisionmakers who are only weakly
responsible to the electorate, and who are often only informed
by preconception and by partisan, adversary briefs. Perhaps not

surprisingly, at least one court has interpreted the current lowlevel equal protection case law to "[call] upon the judge's per'28
sonal understanding of the needs of society.
This process of gradual transference of effective authority
from the legislature to the courts is of course predominantly not

a matter of willful usurpation. Even some courts that inquire
into whether the legislative classification is "discriminatory"

apparently intend only a narrow inquiry, readily withstood by
most classifications, as indicated by the frequent qualification
that the discrimination be "invidious.' '29 The term "invidious"
may often be intended in a restrictive sense, as to imply, perhaps,

"obvious" or "blatant" discrimination.

0

This restriction unfor-

tunately appears to be of little independent force, and may in

fact in the minds of some courts add nothing at all beyond what
s
is already implied by "discrimination."'
Some formulations that are evidently intended to be quite
restrictive of judicial prerogative are nonetheless unduly susceptible of abuse through later judicial expansion. One court, for

example, has observed that "[t]he Legislature had wide discretion ... and any possible resulting classifications . . . may only
be overthrown by a clear affirmative showing that they were
palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt, erroneous. 3 2 DeDeibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 334 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986).
29

See, e.g., People v. Romo, 534 P.2d 1015, 1020, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111, 116 (1975)

(en banc); Jones, 555 P.2d at 407; Henry, 518 P.3d at 365.
See Jones, 555 P.2d at 407.
See, e.g., Kirk v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Okla.
1979); Eaton v. State, 363 A.2d 440, 441, 441 n.2 (Del. 1976). Cf. Bennett, "Mere"
Rationality in Constitutional Law: JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 Cpin'.
L. REv. 1049, 1049 n.2 (1979) (the Supreme Court used "the words 'arbitrary,' 'capricious,' and 'invidious' apparently as alternative formulations of the rationality requirement").
11 Riverside Steel Const. Co. v. William H. Simpson Const. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr.
424, 429 (Ct. App. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted), petition for review granted, 709
P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985).
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spite its literal restrictiveness, this formulation focuses crucially
on a largely unconstrainable "arbitrariness" determination and
on a strong showing that the classification is somehow "erroneous." Of course, a classification literally cannot be erroneous,
since it is a legislative act, rather than an assertion of fact. The
formulation therefore invites a potentially broad judicial inquiry
into whether any relevant errors of empirical fact or of logic
attended the legislative determination.
A court might, for example, find by clear and convincing
evidence that a classification is somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive with respect to its purpose, and is therefore clearly
based on a legislative "error." One commentator has suggested
that a classification is intelligible, on traditional equal protection
grounds, only if it is "predicated on an objective difference
between those included in the classification and those not included, which is relevant to the policy decision government
purports to be implementing. .... -33 This standard allows substantial scope for judicial manipulation. It probably goes too
far to suggest that "it is always possible for a court to define
the evil or the good at which legislation is aimed so as to make
the statutory classifications too broad or too narrow for achieving the purpose thus defined. '3 4 As we shall see below, 35 a court
can ascribe purposes to a statute with greater, or lesser, plausibility although some alleged purposes will be less credible than
others. It is also a substantial oversimplification to suggest that
under a low-level equal protection standard, "even grossly overinclusive classifications are permissible, despite the price that
'36
is paid by the innocent, but included, bystander.
The California Supreme Court in Brown v. Merlo, 7 for
example, struck down an automobile guest statute on state and
federal equal protection grounds as an impermissibly overinclu3 Perry, Modern EqualProtection:A ConceptualizationandAppraisal, 79 CoLWm.
L. REv. 1023, 1068 (1979).
Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
137 (1972).
3 See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
36 Farrell, Equal Protection: Overinclusive Classificationsand Individual Rights,
41 ARK. L. REv. 1, 17 (1988); see Note, RationalBasis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 783 (1987).
37 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (en banc).
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sive classification. 38 The policy supporting this position is that
overinclusive classifications reach beyond the individuals actually
deserving of the burden imposed by the classification. 9 Such
classifications are said to " 'fly squarely in the face of our
traditional antipathy to assertions of mass guilt and guilt by
association." '4° This admittedly grossly overinclusive 41 classification was thus condemned 42 substantially for reasons that are
not confined only to grossly overinclusive classifications. To hold
only a few persons guilty by association may be nearly as objectionable in principle as holding many persons guilty by association.
Courts inclined to use an overinclusiveness/underinclusiveness analysis in an aggressive fashion can draw substantial support from the related moral and legal principle43 that like persons
or cases should be treated alike, or that persons similarly situated
with respect to a statutory classification should be similarly
classified. Both the United States Supreme Court" and a number
of state supreme courts45 have held that one component of the
3' Id. at 227-29, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
39

Id.

Id. at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (quoting Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341, 351-52 (1949)).
4' The statutory classification was held underinclusive with regard to the statutory
aim of preventing fraud. Id. at 228 n.17, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
42 For analogous logic, see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 692,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 395 (1985) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 892 (1985); Hays v. Wood, 603 P.2d 19, 34, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102, 117 (1979) (en
banc) (Mosk, J., concurring) ($1,000 threshold fee reporting requirement for attorneyofficials underinclusive). But cf. In re Arthur W., 217 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188-89 (Ct. App.
1985) (the court, without undertaking an analysis of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness of the age-based classification, upheld a statute providing for a substantially longer
minimum license revocation period for juvenile DUI offenders than for adults committing
the same offense).
43 See ARuSTOTLE, TrE PoLIncs 129-30 (E. Barker trans. 1971); R.
HARE, FREEDOM
AND REASON 48-49 (1963) ("a moral judgement about my own case implies a similar
judgement about similar cases in which other people are involved .... "); Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 40, at 346. But see N. RESCHER, DisTnmuanw JusTicE 57-58 (1966)
(modest qualifications suggested).
- See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano
Co., 253 U.S. at 415).
41 See, e.g., Romo, 543 P.2d at 1020, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 116; Jones,
555 P.2d at
407; see also People v. Carrillo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 684, 690 (Ct. App. 1984); Far West
Services, Inc. v. Livingston, 203 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (Ct. App. 1984); Georgie Boy Mfg.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386 (Ct. App. 1981).
40
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equal protection inquiry requires that all persons similarly situated must be classified or treated alike.
This approach, however popular and authoritative it may
be, is fraught with difficulties. First, the test, as ordinarily
applied in practice, is impossible to satisfy. Few statutory classifications can be expected to be perfect in application so as only
to burden or to benefit those classes of individuals targeted by
the legislature. Courts may well recognize this, but a court that
is inclined to strike down a classification based merely on a
policy disagreement may find little to constrain it from finding
the departure from legislative perfection to be "excessive." Second, a court that is unsympathetic with the policy underlying
the classification may well be able to manipulate the legal determination of the parameters of the classification. It will not
always be obvious which characteristics relevantly differentiate
one person from another. Third, and more generally, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of an injunction requiring similarly situated persons to be treated similarly. Should this be a
mere component of an equal protection test, rather than the
very essence of such a test? The principle of treating like cases
alike is the touchstone of mainstream Western theories of ethics
and distributive justice. 46 Is the principle, however, of any practical use? Is such a principle perhaps merely vacuous and uninstructive until "filled in" in one controversial fashion or
4
another? 1
Regardless of how these divergent perspectives on the "similarly situated" requirement are eventually sorted out, it seems
inevitable that the greater the independent role accorded to this
test in equal protection jurisprudence, the greater the potential

46

See ARISTOTLE supra note 43 and accompanying text.

See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HAgv. L. REv. 537 (1982). This
article is discussed in a series of articles and replies: Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality:
A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983); D'Amato, Comment: Is
Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600 (1983); Westen, The Meaning
of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 604 (1983);
Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas". Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules,
91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas". Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153
(1982); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1167 (1983);
Westen, To Lure the TarantulaFrom Its Hole: A Response, 83 COLum. L. REv. 1186
(1983).
47
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for licensing judicial vetoing of statutory classifications that are
merely unappealing to the reviewing court. At best, the "similarly situated" requirement can serve as the framework for a
broad ethical principle by which any judicial equal protection
formula can be evaluated. If courts insist on using the "similarly
situated" principle in a legal and not merely philosophical role,
they should make an effort to neutralize or to contain its potential for abuse. One. California court4 8 has attempted just such
neutralization. The court agreed that equal protection requires
that persons similarly situated, with regard to what it referred
to as "the legitimate purpose ' 49 of the classification, be treated
alike. The court nonetheless. qualified and limited the scope of
that requirement by declaring that equal protection "does not
preclude a state from making some distinctions as long as they
are reasonable and not arbitrary. '" Although it is true that an
arbitrariness test is an insufficiently reliable bulwark against
judicial imperialism, the court is correct in its basic notion of
limiting the scope and force of the "similarly situated" principle
by establishing a "trumping" principle recognizing broad legislative discretion. 51
One final, noteworthy approach to low-level equal protection
de-emphasizes the importance of the precise linguistic formulation of the test, as long as the test is understood to require " 'a
serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence
between the classification and the legislative goals.' ' 52 This approach assumes that it is possible to bypass the necessity of
choosing between formulas requiring, for example, that the clas-

sification bear only some rational relationship to a merely con-

- Stroh v. Midway Restaurant Systems, 226 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1986).
41 Id. at 159.
,o Id.

11See, e.g., Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 859 (Congress need not burden precisely
everyone, for otherwise arguably no one within a category would be implicated by the
adopted purpose of the statute).
52 Newland v. Board of Governors, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624
(1977) (en banc) (quoting Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 420 U.S. 584 (1974)). See also the cases collected in Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 606 n.15 (Ct. App. 1986), vacated, 723 P.2d 1248, 229 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1986)
(en banc).
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ceivable state interest, or that the classification rest on a difference
53
fairly and substantially related to the statutory purpose.
This assumption, though, is questionable. A test requiring
only a showing of rationality of relationship to a conceivable
state interest is less demanding than the "fair and substantial"
relationship test, and will be met by some classifications unable
to meet the latter formulation. That the courts have not uniformly settled on one formulation to the exclusion of the other-hardly shows that they are interchangeable. The cynically inclined might even imagine that both lax and stringent formulas
have persisted precisely because of their divergent implications,
thus allowing the courts maximum discretion in ensuring that
equal protection cases need not be decided contrary to their own
policy preferences.
The "serious and genuine inquiry" standard may have been
intended as a "move away from" 55 more traditional equal protection tests, but in logic and practice it is inevitably tied to such
tests. The primary problem is that the defenders of relatively lax
and deferential tests can claim that their favored formulas also
require a "serious and genuine inquiry" into the connection
between classification and goals. That a test is ultimately narrow
and deferential does not mean that it is not serious and genuine,
as the Supreme Court has reminded us. 5 6 The courts adopting
the "serious and genuine inquiry" approach appear to concede
this point 5 7 although it seems possible that the intent underlying
the "serious and genuine inquiry" approach was in fact to favor
a more restrictive, less deferential approach. Greater restrictiveness, however, has not been the uniform result of the "serious
and genuine inquiry" test. Courts applying the "serious and

" See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 660 P.2d 829,
837, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371, 379 (1983), vacated, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984);
Hooper, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
Newland, 566 P.2d at 257, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
"Talley v. Municipal Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 743, 746 (Ct. App. 1978).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
("[a]lthough [the court's] inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one" in testing for agency arbitrariness and
capriciousness).
11See Cooper v. Bray, 582 P.2d 604, 608, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152 (1978) (en
banc); Newland, 566 P.2d at 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
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genuine inquiry" approach have, for example, upheld statutory
classifications on the basis of merely presumed, hypothetical
legislative purposes and the reasonable balancing of competing
interests.5 8 In addition, the "serious and genuine inquiry" approach is neither uniformly cited, nor applied, by all courts
nominally bound by precedent to do so. 9
Ultimately, then, the "serious and genuine inquiry" approach at best shares with the various alternative formulas discussed above an excessive indeterminacy, equivocality, and
vulnerability to judicial manipulation. The tests reviewed in this
section afford insufficient protection against any judicial impulse
to hold unconstitutional those legislative classifications which
are merely distasteful, as opposed to those that are subject to
legitimate low-level equal protection attack. The examination
now turns to the nature and logic of a more uniformly deferential test.

II.

THE

EX-ANTE NONIDENTIFIABILITY OF THE BURDENED AS

AN INDICATOR OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CLASSIFICATION

For purposes of analysis, it is usually appropriate to think
of most statutory classifications as establishing four categories,
although in any given case not all categories may be involved.
The four categories may be thought of as including those persons
who are or are not distinctively benefitted by the classification
and those persons who are or are not distinctively burdened by
the classification 0 Some judges consider the degree of concentration or dispersion of benefits and burdens to be relevant in
assessing the constitutionality of a classification, even when the
classification is not considered to be suspect. 61 There is good

11See Farmers Ins. Exchange, 628 P.2d at 3, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 849; Barme v.
Wood, 176 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1984); Georgie Boy Mfg., Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
11See, e.g., Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 506 (1981)
(ultimately concluding that the court's "function is to find, if possible, some means to
sustain, not reject" the classifications).
10 Consider, for example, the complex array of benefits and burdens at issue in
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980) (per curiam) (medical malpractice

reform statute).
6,See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 746 (Ill.
1976) (Underwood, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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reason to do so, in that widely dispersed benefits and costs
suggest that the classification was not procured solely to benefit
a discrete special interest group or to affect adversely another
group. 62 Thus, issues of the legitimacy of the legislative purpose
do not arise. Professor James Q. Wilson has observed that under
such conditions, "[i]nterest groups have little incentive to form
around such issues because no small, definable segment of society ... can expect to capture a disproportionate share of the
benefits or avoid a disproportionate share of the burdens." 63 All
else being equal, statutory classifications of this type should be
expected successfully to pass low-level scrutiny. Equal protection
challenges tend to focus on unfair burdening rather than unfair
benefitting of other persons.
Advocates of rigorous versions of low-level scrutiny, or of
even more intensive scrutiny, often seek to stand the above
analysis on its head by arguing that at least some instances of
widely dispersed burdens, apart from the burdening of suspect
classifications, simply bespeak the political powerlessness of the
burdened classes. It seems undeniable that classes such as future
medical malpractice victims with injuries of a kind or severity
not fully compensated under a new statute or future automobile
guest passengers who will be negligently injured are in a sense
politically powerless, 64 in that they currently face high costs of
organization for later collective benefit. 65 Such classes may well
be less easily organized and mobilized than the beneficiaries of
classifications that burden them. This is especially true if one
makes the crucial assumption that the beneficiaries of such classifications are narrow, tightly concentrated, well-organized groups
such as physicians or major insurance companies.
Also constitutionally relevant is the fact that the persons
burdened by such classifications, including seriously injured malpractice victims and negligently injured automobile guests, are
61 See J. WILSON, The Politicsof Regulation, in Tit POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
366-70 (1980). See generally M. OLSON, Tm LoGIc OF COLLECTIV ACTION (1965).
63 Wilson, supra note 62, at 367.

See Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1064 (Kan. 1987) (citing Learner,
Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro
Quo" Analysis to Safeguard IndividualLiberties, 18 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 143, 184, 189
(1981)).
61See generally M. OLSON, supra note 62.
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hardly discrete and insular minorities6 in the sense of being
historically set apart and treated disparagingly. If they are powerless, they are no more powerless than those with future fully
compensable medical malpractice injuries, those who will in the
future be injured as taxicab passengers, or even those automobile
drivers who will provide transportation for guest passengers. 67
It is the very reason for their inability to organize at low
cost that suggests why a deferential equal protection test is
appropriate. The classes referred to above are almost purely
nominal or statistical. They are presumably only poorly correlated, at best, with any immutable trait that would assist the
powerful in targeting them as victims. It may be assumed that
most or all members of the state legislature, and most influential
citizens generally, face roughly the same probability as that of
ordinary citizens of being a victim of expensive malpractice or
of being negligently injured as an automobile guest.
Not only are victims of expensive malpractice or negligent
driving not stereotyped or socially stigmatized in the abstract,
they are not even concretely identifiable ex ante. At the time of
enactment of the classification, the legislative enactor recognizes
that she may well be acting to her own future detriment. If
problems associated with the legitimacy of legislative purpose
are set aside for the moment, the nonidentifiability at the time
of enactment of the actual future "victims" of the enactment
should encourage great confidence in the fairness, if not the
wisdom, of the enactment even if "fundamental" constitutional
rights are involved. 68 This should, therefore, elicit only the most
See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
67

Cf. Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362, 367 (Kan. 1974) (noting the anomaly of

court decisions treating entering automobile guests substantially differently than departing automobile guests, but failing to consider whether either of these two groups was
more politically powerless than the other).
The unpredictability of future consequences for the decisionmaker herself of her
own present decision is crucial to the argument of writers such as John Rawls. See J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 136-42 (1971) (discussing the "veil of ignorance" device);
see also R. HARE, MORAL THINcG: ITs LEvErs, METHOD AND POINT 128-29 (1981)
(discussing the technique of a decisionmaker imagining herself in the position of each
of the affected parties in turn, or imagining herself having an equal chance of occupying
the position of any of the parties to be affected by her decision); J. MACKUE, ETMCS:
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG

84 (1978) (moral judgments referring to concretely iden-

tified persons as "universalized" only if reference to such named individuals is replaced
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deferential sort of review, which is understood as a test that by
its nature and ordinary application recognizes the probable legitimacy of the classification in light of the nature and origin of
that classification.
Objection to this approach is possible. One might envision,
at least hypothetically, a legislative enactment under which each
person in the society would be assigned a unique number. Every
year, one number would be drawn randomly out of a drum with
the chosen person being put to death with great ceremony. The
purposes of the statute and the issue of "fundamental rights" 69
aside, could it not be said that the classification violates the
equal protection of the laws? There is, indeed, great concentration of burden, and the burden does seem severe. It is really
only our laudable instincts, rather than sound theory, however,
that suggest anything other than the most deferential equal protection review. All persons are equally, if insufficiently, protected, largely because of the unpredictability ex ante of the
victim's identity. The statute is, nonetheless, clearly unconstitutional. It is, however, more naturally struck down as a violation
of substantive due process,70 or of the privileges and immunities
clause, 71 or of the ninth amendment, 72 or even as a cruel and
unusual punishment,7 3 than as a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.
This analysis allows us to clarify the equal protection issues
in a range of cases. The statute at issue in Jones v. State Board
of Medicine,74 for example, in effect permitted full recovery for

by reference to some general class of persons sharing a relevant trait). It may be noted
that if legislators are thought of as risk-averse, they will be especially reluctant to enact
a statute that may, unpredictably, turn out to burden their own fundamental constitutional rights, along with the fundamental constitutional rights of others. Of course, a
society may be unwilling to risk everyone's fundamental rights, even on an equal
protection theory, on the assumption that the members of the legislature will avoid
risking their own fundamental constitutional rights.
6 See generally Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
MicH. L. Rv.981 (1981).
10See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and id. at amend. XIV, § I.
72 See id. at amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people").
11See id. at amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
74555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976).
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medical malpractice victims with injuries not exceeding $150,000,
but barred full recovery, or recovery beyond $150,000, for those
more seriously injured in such cases. 75 The court formulated the
inquiry as whether the classification was "invidiously
discriminatory ' 76 as against those more seriously injured. The
Jones court held that the classification would be invidiously
discriminatory if it failed to meet the following test: "Does the
statute reflect any reasonably conceived public purpose, and does
the establishment of the classification have a fair and substantial
relation to the achievement of the objective and purpose. '77
Since the lower court had found the statute unconstitutional
under strict scrutiny, the court remanded the case to be determined under the standard set out above. Therefore, technically,
the lower court was reversed, but the Jones court did not find
the statute constitutional per se.
The term "invidious" is of course richly ambiguous, and its
senses vary in their moral import. If "invidious" is taken to
mean only "damaging," then the classification is perhaps "invidiously discriminatory" toward those who turn out, unpredictably, to be most seriously injured. All classifications that
impose burdens will then, however, be "invidious" and unconstitutional. In the more useful sense of the term "invidious,"
when an intent to deprecate is implied, or at least some unsympathetic state of mind toward the victim exists, the classification
is plainly not "invidious." Victims of serious medical malpractice injuries are neither stigmatized in the abstract nor thought
to be concretely identifiable in advance. The most deferential
scrutiny is therefore owed.
A difficult test of the ex ante identifiability approach is
provided by the recent case of Park 'n Fly v. City of South San
Francisco.78 The fairness of a business license tax is normally
tested by deferential standards. 79 In this case, however, the plaintiff claimed that the ordinance in question was drafted to apply
to only two taxpayers, so as to increase the City's business license
71

Jones, 555 P.2d at 410.

76

Id.

Id. at 411.
234 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Ct. App. 1987).
71 Id. at 31 (citing Cohan v. Alvord, 208 Cal. Rptr. 421, 425 (Ct. App. 1984)).
7

71
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tax revenues by fifty percent, and to result in the plaintiff's
paying a total of 16 percent of the City's business license taxes. 80
The Park 'n Fly court held that the license tax did not violate
equal protection. 81 If these allegations had been accepted as true,
however, it would have been difficult to argue that the ordinance
deserved only the most deferential sort of low-level equal protection scrutiny. This is because the ordinance would, according
to the plaintiff's complaint, come close to, in effect, naming a
very limited number of parties, concretely identified ex ante, to
bear an allegedly disproportionate share of the tax burden. If
an ordinance singles out by its own terms a particular person,
politically powerless or not, for a concentrated burden, much of
the reason for great judicial deference to the classification evaporates. The reason for customary judicial deference to legislative
determinations is thus absent, and such deference is no longer
82
appropriate.
A similarly interesting, but more unusual, test for the ex
ante identifiability approach is provided by the case of Hays v.
Wood.83 Hays involved a state statute that required public officials, who were either attorneys or brokers, to disclose the names
of clients providing them with income greater than $1,000 per
year. The statute required all other public officials to disclose
only the names of clients who provided income greater than
$10,000 per year.84 The burdened class under this statutory discrimination was, at least initially, concretely identifiable at the
time of the enactment. The discrimination does certainly seem
"invidious" in the sense of conveying a message of distrust for
lawyers and brokers. Great judicial deference would, therefore,
seem inappropriate. Depending on the facts, this statutory classification might well deserve only the most minimal scrutiny.
Such limited scrutiny would be appropriate to the extent that
incumbents were not advantaged, which seems evident, and to

90Id.
11Id. at 32.
12 Cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 628 (1969) (when the
assumption of fair legislative representation is challenged, judicial deference based precisely on a general assumption of fair representation is not appropriate).
83603 P.2d 19, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1979) (en banc).
" Id. at 21, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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the extent that the burdened classes are voluntarily imposing the
burden on themselves. A rare instance of a group of public
officials voluntarily undertaking to predictably disadvantage
themselves, thereby calling into play the legal maxim of "volenti
86
non fit injuria, 8' 5 is to be encouraged by judicial deference.
III.

THE

DETERMINATION OF STATUTORY PURPOSES AND
GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS

The previous section has argued that the inability of the

enacting legislature to identify in advance the particularly affected individuals under a statutory classification is ordinarily a

strong indicator of the compatibility of the classification with
the equal protection clause.8 7 This holds especially true within
the typical context of low-level equal protection cases in which

no suspect or quasi-suspect classification or fundamental right
is present.8 8 The argument could be equally as valid by omitting
this qualification. One must be willing, however, to stipulate
that if a classification predictably will exclusively disadvantage
only some members of a powerless racial minority, without the
precise identity of the individual victims within that racial category being further predictable, then the level at which the victim
must be reasonably predictable, in order for the classification to
be tainted, must be the level of the racial group itself. Reformulating the argument in this way does not raise a matter of
principle. Nevertheless, it seems clear that under familiar equal
protection tests, some account should be taken of a further

85 The policies underlying the doctrine of voluntary assumption of a known,
understood, and fully appreciated risk do not dissolve merely because the "risk" of
injury is understood to be a certainty.
" An analogue to this perspective is occasionally taken even in suspect classification, strict or quasi-strict scrutiny, equal protection cases, as in the voluntary, or allegedly
voluntary, affirmative action cases. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 735 (1974); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
106 S. Ct. 1842, 1844-45 n.l, 1850 n.5 (1986) (plurality opinion) (lack of clarity as to
degree and scope of voluntariness of the assumption of the burdens of the affirmative
action'plan). Justice Powell's plurality opinion observes that "when a state implements
a race-based plan that requires ... a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the
discriminatory effect on some individuals because other individuals had approved the
plan." Id. at 1850 n.8.
87 See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
18See supra notes 1-3.
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problem. At least in principle, a classification could be unpredictable in its burdening at the individual level yet still be motivated solely by, or somehow in furtherance of, only an
illegitimate legislative purpose.8 9 Whether this is really a matter
of the equal protection of the laws, rather than, for example,
due process, is doubtful.9 The courts often insist, however, on
an equal protection rubric, 9' and therefore this Article must
consider the legitimacy-of-purpose problem as well.
The legitimacy-of-purpose problem involves not only an evaluation of the legitimacy of the detected or ascribed legislative
purpose, but also a difficult preliminary inquiry into how broadly
a court should hunt for purposes, reasons, or even mere consequences, that may justify a statutory classification. It is often
thought impossible or unhelpful to determine the intent of a
continuing, multi-member legislative body. It is also not immediately clear whether a sensible equal protection test should
recognize hypothetical, or merely conceivable, legislative purposes, or content itself with actual collective legislative intent,
as subjectively felt or somehow objectively expressed, at the time
of statutory enactment. However ascertained, such purposes,
legitimate or illegitimate, may be multiple, or a complex tradeoff maximizing no single value. Finally, courts should arguably
not confine their search to such intentions, beliefs, and suppositions as the enacting legislature actually entertained or even
might have entertained, as opposed to justifying a classification
through unintended, later-accruing benefits or arguably favorable consequences. Certainly a governmental "interest," to which
a classification might be rationally related, 92 need not have been
recognized as a governmental interest, or even recognized at all,
by anyone at the time of enactment. A society might have an
interest served by a classification in the absence of any intent,

19See,

e.g., Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
90 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (fundamental right to marry
and procreate case decided on equal protection grounds); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization case decided on the basis of a fundamental
interests equal protection standard). But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (family living arrangement case decided under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
9See
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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or subjective purpose, to promote that interest. There is thus no
initial reason to suppose that statutory classifications need be
justified by reference exclusively to purpose, as opposed to the
classification's effects on or consequences for one or more purported arguable governmental interests. Because much of the
case law and scholarly literature focuses narrowly on governmental purpose and related concepts, however, it is best to begin
there.
The common, but mistaken, view that applying low-level
equal protection scrutiny virtually ensures that the classification
will be held not to violate the equal protection clause93 is based,
in part, on the assumption that the requirement of furtherance
of at least some sort of governmental purpose is met by any
legislative classification. 94 Under this approach, low-level scrutiny is practically meaningless, if not tautological. A related
view, but one which does not support the conclusion that lowlevel scrutiny tests are almost invariably passed, is that low-level
equal protection tests are almost limitlessly arbitrary. Professor,
now Judge, Linde expressed this notion in the following terms:
"The outcome of an attack on the rationality of a law clearly
can be made to depend on whether the law is described as a
means toward a somewhat remote end or as very close to an
end in itself." 95 In the language of interests rather than purposes,
it has been suggested that "[b]ecause classifications always further some interest, findings of rationality or irrationality ultimately hinge upon the Court's choice of interests to evaluate
9' 6
and its characterization of such interests.

91See, e.g., Hays v. Wood, 603 P.2d 19, 21-22, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102, 114-15 (1979)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (rational relationship test "virtually always met" and the result
"foreordained"); see also Perry, supra note 33, at 1070 ("the rationality requirement is
largely inconsequential as a constraint on the power of government"); Claremont McKenna
College v. Estate of Rose, 240 Cal. Rptr. 295, 296 (Ct. App. 1987) (referring to "one
of the few cases to strike down a legislative classification for lack of a rational basis").
94 See Perry, supra note 33, at 1070; see also Bennett, supra note 31, at 1059
(1974) (invariably possible to construct a fictionalized statutory "purpose" perfectly
accomplished by the statutory classification).
95Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Ra,. 197, 212 (1976).
Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 CoLum. L.
REv. 1184, 1192 (1986); see also Note, supra note 34, at 137 (positing that it is "always
possible" to ignore, oversimplify, or invidiously redefine a legislative purpose).
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It may perhaps be true that technically it is "always
possible ' 97 for a court to characterize the legislative purpose or
intent in whichever way it wishes. It is crucial to recognize,
however, that while one or more presumed legislative purposes
are susceptible to diverse characterization, sheer plausibility sets
important practical limitations on the scope of the court's discretion in this regard. A purpose may be expressed in narrower
or broader terms, and not all purposes need be narrowly instrumental; a legislative classification might have a merely expressive, symbolic, 9 or what might be called a quasi-performative99
purpose. There are limits, nonetheless, beyond which it becomes
simply unconvincing to expand, to narrow, or to render selffulfilling an alleged legislative purpose.
Suppose, for example, that a legislature establishes a statutory distinction between insured and uninsured motorists, or
between tax delinquents and non-tax delinquents. No doubt it is
possible in principle for a court to characterize these classifications as wildly overinclusive or underinclusive. 1 ° As a practical
matter, any judicial claim that the classifications are substantially
overinclusive because the legislature sought to burden only those
within the burdened categories who are deeply morally culpable,
or that the classifications are substantially underinclusive, because the legislature sought to burden all sorts of socially disfavored conduct in general, is utterly implausible. The range of
judicial manipulability of the breadth or narrowness of legislative
purpose is set not in logic,' ° ' but in practical plausibility.
The result is the same when we consider the possibility that
a statutory classification burdening some persons and benefitting
others might be intended not to aim at accomplishing some sort

9 Note, supra note 34, at 137.
91 See generally M. EDELMAN, THE SyMmoLc UsEs OF POLITICS (1964).
See generally J. AusTiN, How TO Do THNGS wrm WoRDs (1964) (the author
discusses "performatives," or indicative-mood phrases that themselves constitute the
presumably successful performance of an action, and are therefore not dependent upon
contingent events, beyond context and convention, for their sense and rationality. A
simple example would be "I promise," which, if it makes any statement at all, is "selffulfillingly" true).
'0
See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
101Cf. Note, supra note 34, at 137 (foctrsing on the range of broader or narrower
possible state purposes).
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of extrinsic task, but simply to "make a statement,'" to express
a sentiment, or to stand as a "symbol." 10 2 The goal of such a
statute, if it has a goal at all, is. clearly not very far off; the
publication of the statute is "very close to an end in itself."'0 3
Such statutes are still meaningfully subject to review for the
relation between intent and classification. They are not selfjustifying in this sense. Symbolic or expressively intended classifications may, conceivably, miss the mark, or lack plausibility.
A legislature or a court cannot immunize a statute from intelligent purpose-oriented review merely by declaring, or finding,
that it isintended to operate expressively as, for example, a
symbolic tribute or gesture of appreciation toward Vietnam veterans. Such a declaration or finding may simply be generally
implausible, and hence insufficient, if it isapparent from the
text, legislative history, or historical context that the statute has
nothing specially to do with Vietnam veterans, or else imposes
what looks unequivocally like a burden, such as a special five
dollar tax, on Vietnam veterans. Practical plausibility again sets
limits on the statute's vulnerability to judicial manipulation of
14
the equal protection inquiry into legislative purpose. 0
Although the inquiry into legislative purpose is therefore
more meaningful than is often supposed, this is not to suggest
that it is not problematic. While courts often seek to ascertain
the conscious or purposeful collective intent of the legislature, 05

102 A legislative declaration "conferring
the Boy Scouts, would count as an example.
compiled by Professor Frank Michelman in
Really Wrong With Rationality Review?, 13
103Linde, supra note 95, at 212.

104It is

honor" upon a distinctive group, such as
For other, real-world examples, see the list
Michelman, Politics and Values Or What's
CEIGHTON L, REv. 487, 508 (1979).

often suggested that at least some statutes are not intended to "accomplish"

something, or fulfill some legislative purpose or goal but are simply non-teleological

interest group "deals," reflecting merely the vector of political forces. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domaiht, 50 U. 0in, L, REv, 533 (1983). Even so, if everyone affected
by the statute is unexpectedly made worse off because of unanticipated consequences,

the statute might be struck down not merely because no purpose can be detected that
qualifies as legitimate or public-interested, but because the statute has failed of its
essential private-interest purposes. See id. at 551, A rent control statute could be

considered an interesting example of the foregoing.
"I5See, e.g., Cooper v. Bray, 582 P.2d 604, 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156 (1978)
(en banc),
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this process is notoriously difficult. °6 Inquiry into the subjective
motivation of legislators is perhaps -even more difficult 01° ;and
judicially disfavored. 0 8 A theory -of equal protection, therefore,
should rely as little as possible, as does the theory prescribed
herein, on attempts to ascertain legislative motive or intent.
Nevertheless, in a limited range of cases, intent and even motive
may seem as relevant as actual consequences and ,effects. Whether
or not a statutory classification "counts" as a slur or a disparagement may depend upon whether it was so intended by one
or more legislators whose votes were required to enact the legislation. In such cases, reviewing courts must simply piece together the best evidence of intent or motive available." ° Even in
this context, however, "victim" identifiability ex ante may provide some useful guidance to the reviewing courts.
One important means of limiting the need for the courts to
rely on the probing of legislative motive, and even legislative
intent, is to recognize that statutory classifications do not violate
the equal protection clause merely because they can only be
justified, currently or even at the time of enactment," 0 by reference to hypothetical states of affairs or to merely conceivable
public purposes. It has been suggested that justifying statutory
classifications by reference to merely conceivable, or reasonably
conceivable purposes, in effect tests only the limits of the reviewing court's imagination, and amounts not to judicial deference, but to judicial abdication."'
Let us suppose that the statutory classification was intended
to serve a single purpose, or even a complex mixture of purposes," 2 but that the logic of, or the factual foundation for,
106
See,

e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs: CRisIs AND REFORM 261-93 (1985);

Easterbrook, supra note 104; Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HRv.J.L. & PuB. POLICY 59 (1988).
107See R. POSNER, supra note 106, at 267 ("[c]ourts do not have the research tools
needed to uncover the motives behind legislation").
. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 495, 501, 119
Cal. Rptr. 631, 637 (1975) (en banc).
109See id.
1o See Linde, supra note 95, at 215 ("[tlhe problem of time is whether a law is to
be judged for its rationality when it was enacted or at the time when it is challenged").
" See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (Idaho 1976).
.2 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 859 (1988) (recognition
of the possibility of combinations of purposes).
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such purpose or purposes has completely evaporated over time.

Typically, the actual consequences of the statutory classification
are not entirely foreseen by any member of the enacting majority. Some of these unforeseen consequences may be generally
considered undesirable. 13 Other unforeseen, and therefore unintended, consequences will be widely thought of as desirable."

4

To require a legislature to reenact verbatim a statute merely
because the currently reasonable justification did not exist at the

time of enactment is not merely wasteful but a judicial impertinence as long as certain minimum requirements were met at
the time of enactment. Chief among such requirements, as discussed above, 1 5 is the view that no violation of equal protection
should ordinarily be found if the distribution of benefits and
burdens under the statute is unpredictable at the level of
individuals" 6 by the enacting legislators" 7 at the time of enactment.11 8 While the courts continue to be divided on the propriety

113 Consider, for example, the inequities and the reduction in the supply and
maintenance of affordable rental housing under a typical residential rent control program.
ri Professor Bennett cites the national 55 mile-per-hour speed limit as intended to
serve the purpose of conserving gasoline, but as also operating, even in periods without
fuel shortages or high oil prices, to reduce significantly the number of traffic fatalities.
Bennett, supra note 31, at 1074.
"I3See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
116 Focusing on individuals suffices for most of the common cases, but there may
well be cases in which particular families or groups such as races or classes, are
predictably burdened, and where this seems relevant to the equal protection issue. Of
course, if a classification is thought to violate equal protection merely because it
predictably burdens specially one fluid social or economic class or another, most ordinary
legislation will be struck down.
117 This is not to suggest that the unpredictability of burdening or benefitting at
the individual level is a necessary, rather than a generally sufficient, condition for finding
no violation of equal protection. A statute that imposed a thousand dollar tax on every
aluminum can-producing plant in order to fund an aluminum can recycling project could
well be constitutional, despite the fact that the initial incidence, or burden of the tax, is
quite predictable at the level of individual plants, or owners, at or prior to the time of
enactment.
I'8 One might envision complicating circumstances. Suppose a legislature enacts a
statute imposing a ceiling on medical malpractice injury recoveries, without the slightest
ability to foresee who, in particular, will be disadvantaged by the statute because of an
unusually expensive malpractice injury. Scientists then discover, remarkably, that all of
those and only those persons with a particular length forefinger become victims of
unusually expensive malpractice injuries. Legislators, along with the rest of us, can now
know with certainty who is and is not doomed to eventually feel the burden of the
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of justifying classifications by recourse to conceivable, or to
reasonably conceivable, purposes, 119 it is clear upon analysis that

whatever reasons exist for striking down classifications justifiable
only on such bases, they are not reasons of equal protection.
The courts rightly impose more exacting standards on the pron-

ouncements of nonelected governmental administrative agencies, 12° but legislation enacted by a popularly representative

legislature under the conditions specified above need not be
subjected to such scrutiny in the name of equal protection.

Of course, what might be called the "lapsed purpose" case
does not exhaust the range of special problems associated with

an ascertained legislative intent. Sometimes, the legislative purpose may seem constitutionally illegitimate. The courts have
traditionally felt it appropriate to strike down legislative classi-

fications on that basis.' 2' Also, a court may find that the only
reasonably detectable public interest or purpose intended to be

served by a statutory classification is, in practice, actually being

statutory classification. The thesis developed in this Article requires either that this state
of affairs not constitute a violation of equal protection, or that it be viewed as an
unusual aberration, not substantially impairing the ordinary utility of the approach
suggested herein.
119Compare Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 13-14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505-06 (1981)
(explicit consideration of what the enacting legislature "may" or "might" have thought)
and Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 417 (Ct. App. 1985)
(judicial consideration of the legitimate state interest in promoting marriage even though
"promoting marriage is not one of the express purposes of the Act") with Boucher v.
Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 92 (R.I. 1983) (inquiring "whether the classifications rationally
further a purpose articulated by the state") and Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665, 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386-87 (1985) (en banc), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 892 (1985) (permitting recourse to hypothetical reasonable legislative intent,
but disclaiming recourse to "invented fictitious purposes that could not have been within
the contemplation of the Legislature") and Cooper, 582 P.2d at 612, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
156 (finding it "difficult to attribute to the Legislature a conscious intent to protect
negligent drivers from liability for injuries which they inflict upon owner-passengers").
,"I See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 46-57 (1983) (setting aside informal agency rulemaking because of the agency's
perceived failure adequately to consider and to discuss important alternative policy
choices); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1976) (a plausible governmental objective not credited because it was assumed not to have motivated, within the
scope of their assigned responsibilities, the various particular agency defendants); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-90, 93-95 (1943) (declining to validate an administrative order on any grounds other than those actually relied upon by the agency).
"I'See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (legitimate state
interest required).
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disserved, or only minimally servedJ -2 In fact, appellate courts

have occasionally, gone so. far as to, hold legislative classifications
violative, of the- equal protection, clause on the remarkable basis
that a.trial court's finding of no legitimate purpose for the
classification was, if not actually convincing to the appellate

court, at least not "clearly erroneous-"1' Others have- abused
the concept, of judicial notice by purporting to take "judicial
notice" of the. correctness. of a, controversial. approach to an
obviously complex issue of policy and. empirical fact.1z '
Such. courts,, under, the guise- of detecting the advancement

of-noQ legitimate state purpose by-the. statutory classification,
ordinarily- either reweigh, the balance of the interests involved!z
or presume; to, weigh the persuasiveness of the factual and policy

"'evidence," much like a legislature,.' While no,court concedes
that it,
is- ia fact questioning "the: wisdon or desirability of
legislative- policy de.terminations," '2 z , many succumb, to; the temptatior. tm disregard the limitations of their constitutional, role, as
5
well as the.limits, of their- practical institutional capabilitiesY

112See; e.g., Crowe v. Wigglesworth;.623F-. Supp. 699, 706-(D. Kan., 1985) (federal
trial, judge, "not at all, persuaded" by the: policy logic- of the state legislature; in.
the
legislature's "haste," it "overlooked or,, more, likely,, ignored"" the line of causatior
persuasive- to, the judge deciding the case);- Fad'ey,v. Engelken, 740 Et2d 1058, 1067'
(Kan. 19&7); ("[w]hile- the legislature!'-, purpose in, enacting [the statute] may have, been.
to increase the: quality, and availability of health care,, application of such a statute is
counterproductive");- Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99;, 103 (Or. 1974) (en banc), (if a.
classification, is to be found,irrational,, the court "must he prepared to, point to factual
data which disproves, or-experience which, belies, the legislative assumptions. upon which
the legslation is based").,
M2See-Arneson v. Olson, 270 NW.2& 125; ,136(N. D. 1978)..
'11 See Boucher; 45.9,A.2d, at.- 93 (relying on,judicial, notice, as. well as "'a,plethora
of facts" tosubstantiate, a,
trial, court "finding'" that no malpractice crisis existed as of
a.particularyear, after the enactment of the, legislation),
'' See, e.g., Detar Hosp.,, Inc. v. Estrada, 694, S.W.2d 359,, 366 (TJex. Civ. App.
1985) (finding insufficient. "quid, proquo"'- tojustify restrictions on medical malpractice
actions- and ignoring the possibility that the bepeafits- of reduced! insurance premiums may
tend-to accrue only-after the statute is.
jpdicially upheld) , The court alsoentirely ignored.
the possible benefit- of maintaining, the sheer availability for many citizens of physicians'
services. Id,
' See supra note, 122Z
' See e.g,. Florida Patient's Comp. 1Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. Zd 783,, 789
(Fla. 1985), (per curiam); (quoting Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303).
', Cf: Georgie Boy Mfr., Inc. v., Superior Court-,, l,71 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386 n.4. (Qt.
App., 1981),(noting, with regard to an issue mixing empirica! fact and public policy,, that
"the Legislature is,
set pi to-,
schedule- hearings - and, tQ- probe this issue; the courts, are
not").
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Given the unavoidable limitations on the legislature's own
practical ability to revise or to withdraw obsolete or failed statutory initiatives, 29 and the interest group pressures that may
discourage them from doing so,' 30 one is tempted to adopt an
expansive view of a court's authority to ovjeturn legislative
initiatives on grounds of their present illegitimacy. Ideall y, courts
would recognize, accurately and at a reasonable cost, statutory
,classifications that do not promote a significant -current public
interest, or that primarily promote merely a "private" interest.
Such classifications may legitimately be -held unconstitutional .on
that basis. Professor Cass Sunstein has shown that -the "'legitimate purpose" inquiry in equal protection cases is merely one
manifestation -of.a ',broader constitutional goncern for 'the evil
implicit in ",the distribution of resources or ,opportunities to one
group rather than -another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised -the raw political power to ,get what they
want." '3 1
Of course, those persons or groups -able simply -to ettract
'transfers for their own -benefit, regardless of who else is ,benefitted or 'harmed, .cannot be counted .on to acknowledge that
they 'fit within this category. Presumably, groups deploy an
ideology partly to obscure just such phenomena, making reliable
detection of mere 1power-based statutory initiativ-es difficult for
the judiciary. Even if it is assumed that what the xaw-ppwer
,exercising group wants is to berefit only itself, and -no others,
even indirectly, there is no ,cons-ensus that such political -activity
is 'morally or constitutionally illegitimate.' 32 In fact, it does not

'9 See G. CALABRrsi, A COMoN LJAw FOR THE AoE OF STATuTES 1-7 ,(1982)
(discussing the possibility of an -activist judicial response to the problem -of statutory

obsolescence).
I" See M. OlsoN, THE RisE AND DECLiNE OF NATIoNs -58-65 (1982) (stable system
of special interest groups retards efficient societal -adaptation generally).
"I Sunstein, Naked Preferences -andthe Constitution, 84,CoLuM. L. REv. 1689,
1689 (1984). For a discussion of the natptepf "faction" seealso THE FEDERA-iST No.
10 (J. Madison) (J..Cooke ed. 1961).
"' ,See, e.g., R. PosNER, supra note 106, -at 265 ('"[i]t should be possible .... to

classify statutes according-to whether they advance thepublic interest or advance instead
the interest of some '(narrow) interest group"); *inde, -supra note 95, at 211, 246
(common and-appropriate forlegislation to be intended simply toifavor one group rather
than another); Note, supra note 96, at 1206,(same).,Cf. R. POsNER, suprapnote 106, at
274 ("[s]incze it is inevitable that interest groups will inflipence the legislative process, it
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seem unusual for legislation procured solely in order to benefit
the narrow, procuring "faction" to benefit, directly or indirectly, a broad spectrum of the public. 133 Assume, for example,
that an automobile guest statute was enacted at the behest of
liability insurance companies solely on behalf of their shareholders. 134 We should still be reluctant to allow a court to make the
controversial empirical or policy-laden determination that liability insurance premiums for most drivers would be no higher if
the guest statute had not been enacted, or that the hospitality
justification for the guest statute is somehow fatuous or insufficient in a society increasingly thought to be unduly litigious.
Typically, then, it is inappropriate to entrust courts with the
task of sorting out statutes with sufficient, or necessary, legitimate public purposes and statutes lacking in such purpose, given
the potential for abuse, judicial arbitrariness, and judicial error.
Most of the value that might result from the ideal operation of
a "legitimate purpose" inquiry can be derived from the simpler,
more objective, less manipulable, less demanding inquiry endorsed above.135 Those eventually burdened by a statutory classification would thus be substantially identifiable ex ante, at the
level of individual persons, by the enacting legislature. If it were
typically thought necessary to inquire judicially into the permissibility of the legislative purpose, this Article would suggest
simply that the legitimate legislative purpose inquiry be "operationalized" as the judicial inquiry into ex ante substantial identifiability of those individual persons burdened by the statutory
classification.
CONCLUSION

For the vast range of equal protection cases, the crucial
judicial test should be the ex ante individual identifiability, by
the enacting legislature, of the immediate or eventual "losers,"

cannot be right to invalidate legislation just because it was procured by an interest
group").
"' See the examples referred to by Professor James Q. Wilson in Wilson, supra
note 62, at 369.
'34 See Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212, 225, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 401 (1973) (en
banc).
,35See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
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or those disproportionately burdened by the statutory classification. This relatively simple inquiry captures most, if not all,
of the potential benefits ideally available from alternative formulas, while limiting the potential for judicial arbitrariness,
error, or invasion of the legitimate sphere of a democratically
elected legislature.
As discussed above,'3 6 this test is not empty or invariably
met. Still, some will be disappointed that it will result in the
judicial approval of a wide range of arguably ill-considered
legislation, at least if the judicial challenge is confined solely to
an equal protection theory. 137 Such a reaction may bespeak an
adherence to a questionable model of constitutional tests. A
"low-level" equal protection test need not be thought of as
analogous to a fishing net, which is presumably working at its
optimum level only when it catches plenty of fish. To assume
that a low-level equal protection test is working properly only
when it actually strikes down a substantial proportion of the
statutes it tests is arbitrary at best, or at the very least it is a
worrisome' preoccupation for legislators seeking to comply with
its requirements. If some model or another is insisted upon, one
might think in terms of a fire alarm. One does not evaluate the
soundness of design and operation of a fire alarm by the sheer
frequency with which it is triggered. One instead wants such a
fire alarm to sound at only the right times. This Article has
presented a simple judicial test with these virtues in mind.

"6 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.

"I Potential alternative avenues of constitutional attack, listed supra in text accompanying notes 70-73, may be more appropriate.

